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Abstract. Poverty in Nigeria continues unabated despite huge inflow of remittances.  
Our result supports the argument that remittances can improve economic growth but 
can also worsen overall wellbeing. Reasons for this are, first, remittances 
beneficiaries in Nigeria are concentrated in the middle income class with high 
propensity to consume.  Second, due to high propensity to consume, consumption 
triggers good prices in such a way as to worsen the purchasing power of the poor.  
Third, institutions are weak and the poor do not benefit from weak institution.  Thus 
good quality institutions should be encouraged while ostentatious spending should 
be discouraged. 
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1. Introduction 
he Remittances, defined as the share of foreign-based earnings sent to 
relative(s) in the home country, are said to be large and stable and 
therefore represent additional capital inflow necessary for economic 
development.  The importance of remittances in the developmental process 
of some countries and regions is now receiving greater attention. The 
Millennium Development Goal [MDG] (2005) claimed that remittances act 
as a financial catalysts to close the gap of financial requirements of USD 273 
billion for poverty to reduce by half in 2015. The inflow surpasses the 
amount of Official Development Assistant (ODA) and is more than the size 
of foreign direct investment (FDI).  For instance, remittances are second 
most important source of foreign exchange after oil revenue in Nigeria.  The 
amount of the inflow rose from $22 million in 1980 to $19.8 billion in 2010 
and by 2014, it has increased by more than $1 billion. Due to this huge and 
rising inflow, Nigeria was ranked the fifth remittance receiver in the 
developing world and first in Africa (World Bank, 2014). 
Given this large and continuous inflow to the country, one wonders how 
significant and supposedly positive impact it will have on the economy.  But 
this appears not to be the case because the growth rate of the country before 
 
a† Federal University of Agriculture, Department of Economics, Abeokuta, Nigeria. 
. +234803 218 4121 . olubiyiea@funaab.edu.ng 
b  Elizade University, Department of Economics,  Ilara-Mokin, Nigeria.  
. +234806 771 4940 . Omolola.olarinde@elizadeuniversity.edu.ng 
 
T 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 2(4), E.A. Olubiyi & O.S. Olarinde, p.281-299. 
282 
the surge in remittances was no better than the period of sizable remittances. 
In particular, over the last 30 years (1984-2014), average annual growth was 
4.4 percent while in the first 20 years (1964-1984) the growth rate was 4.3 
percent. Correspondingly, per capita income rose from an annual average of 
US$329 to US$593. In the same vein, poverty, unemployment and inequality 
show disturbing figures which could make one doubt the importance of 
remittances in development. Have remittances contributed significantly to 
per capita income in Nigeria? Have remittances actually reduced poverty in 
Nigeria or is any factor inhibiting the developmental effect of remittances?  
Surprisingly, empirical evidence to answer this question is still missing. 
However, there are pockets of research papers that have investigated this 
area of study, but the results are not convincing due to lack of theoretical 
foundation and weak methodological approach. This paper seeks to fill this 
lacuna by providing evidence based on rigorous analysis built on appropriate 
theoretical underpinning. This theory shows channels through which 
remittances may or may not influence development. To our understanding, 
this is the first paper that will do this for Nigeria. 
   
2. Review of the Literature 
One major constraint in analysing the developmental impact of 
remittances is the lack of theoretical underpinning. Until recently, immanent 
empiricism prevailed where empirical studies were drawn from a hard look 
at the data to form general principles.  More recently, Barajas, Fullenkamp, 
Gapen & Montiel (2009) attempted to document the possible theoretical 
basis of the developmental effect of remittances using the growth accounting 
framework. This generated three basic categoriesnamely: capital 
accumulation, labour force growth and the total factor productivity. 
2.1 Capital Accumulation Theory 
Remittances can serve as substitutes to poorly developed financial 
institution, but can also complement sound financial development, thereby 
reducing cost of capital and increasing investment.  Further, remittances can 
facilitate access to loan and is considered as a guarantee against the loan 
(Barajas et al, 2009) thereby reducing the risk of macroeconomic instability 
that can attenuate the size of investment. However, this possibility depends 
on the consumption pattern of the country. If the consumption is 
characterized by the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) combined with 
high rate of marginal propensity to consume (MPC) and marginal propensity 
to import (MPM), then investment may be negatively affected.  
Remittances can increase the level of human capital either by reducing 
dropout rate or by increasing the rate of tertiary education enrolment.  
However, the supply of skills could outweigh demand, or the acquired skills 
may be irrelevant in the industrial sector. The excess human capital over 
domestic content will either draw down wages or facilitate high level of 
skilled unemployment. Thus, the effect of remittances on development, as 
far as the capital accumulation theory is concerned, depends on the pattern of 
consumption and investment and optimal human capital required for 
development. 
2.2 Labour Force Growth and Total Factor Productivity Theories 
Theoretically, remittances occasion moral hazard because it reduces job 
search.  This moral hazard is intensified by long distance separating the 
remitter from the recipient. The total factor productivity theory holds that if 
domestic investments are efficiently carried out and if productive sectors are 
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dynamically functional, then remittances can enhance total factor 
productivity. Efficient investment prompts the ability to change quality of 
domestic financial intermediary (Barajas et al, 2009). The extent to which 
this can be done depends on first, if the inflow is regarded as capital flow. 
Second, if the remitters and the recipients possess adequate investment 
information and strategies that surpass the one known by the financial 
intermediary and third, if the recipients/remitters possess the ability to make 
efficient use of such information.   
If any of the conditions is violated, remittances may reduce the 
efficiency of domestic investment. Even if all these are satisfied, the relative 
factor content used is also important. In a country where investment is 
largely input-import dependent, import demand will lead to currency 
depreciation and this will make imported inputs more expensive, and by 
implication reduces TFP. 
Another possible channel through which remittances can affect TFP is 
the patterns of consumption in the country. A country with high MPC will 
experience low saving even if remittances increase and by implication, 
reduces the financial deepening of the system. Efficient remittances 
financing is expected to improve economic development if first, it increases 
economies of scale in financial intermediation, and second, if it generates a 
favourable political economy. But in a case where economies of scale are 
non-existent, or where the interest of major remittance depositors are in 
contrast to the interest of the economy as a whole, such efficiency-effect will 
be frustrated.   
It is also possible for remittances to affect TFP by changing the 
dynamic production externalities generated by the economy.  If remittances 
cause Dutch Disease, then the sector that is assumed to be dynamic will be 
affected. A high currency appreciation will make manufactured exports 
expensive and less competitive and by implication generate low demand.  
This will lead to resource reallocation to other sector, thereby strangulating 
the manufactured export sector.   
In the case of the political economy effect, remittances are transfer rather 
than earned through the creation of domestic goods and services where 
private citizens may play positive role in the monitoring and management of 
government policy and its performance over time. Hence, remittances act as 
‘illicit grease money’ used to lubricate the wheels of bad governance and 
allows poor and perhaps inefficient government policy to strive. To the 
extent that governance matters for efficiency and economic development, the 
‘illicit grease money’ will stiffen capital accumulation, dwarf financial 
development and attenuate total factor productivity. 
The review of theories, show that the effect of remittances on economic 
development depends on appropriate transmission mechanism such as 
investment, the labour market condition and the rules guiding economic 
activities (governance institution). Specifically, the extent to which 
remittances positively affects development is conditioned on the 
consumption pattern (altruism), the efficiency of financial intermediary 
(investment), human capital development, and governance institution. 
2.3 Evidence on the effects of remittances on development 
There is a plethora of empirical evidence on the developmental effect of 
remittances. This review focuses on the recent evidence with particular 
attention on the transmission mechanism. The starting point is the work of 
Chami, Fullenkamp & Jahjah (2003) of 104 low and transition economies 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects Mechanism (FEM).  
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They found that a 10 per cent increase in the ratio of country’s remittances to 
GDP leads to a 0.05 percent reduction in GDP per capita growth. With the 
regional dummy, SSA will lose 0.14 per cent in GDP per capita growth to a 
10 per cent increase in remittances. They suggest moral hazard existing 
between the remitter and remittance spending households as candidates for 
this scenario. Their argument is that receivers substitute remittances for 
labour effort – more remittances flow in, the less labour efforts are supplied 
for searching for job, and the more such receivers spend. At times, part of 
the remittances is spent acquiring properties that are classified as non-
productive.   
Evidence from Kenya provided by Kiio, Soi, & Buigut (2014) shows that 
remittances impacted positively on the real per capita growth and capital 
formation in Kenya. Also in Ghana, Antwi, Mills, & Zhao (2013) report in 
their ARDL results that remittances have a significant impact on poverty 
reduction in the country, through increasing income, smoothing consumption 
and easing capital constraints of the poor. Meanwhile, Nyeadi & Atiga 
(2014) found a causality running from remittances to economic growth in 
Ghana in their Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework. They also noted 
that remittances improve household welfare in Ghana. 
In sum, the overall analysis is that whether remittances in the country of 
origin is productive and poverty reducing or counterproductive and poverty 
enhancing is debatable. However, it seems that evidence is skewed more to 
the positive side. 
A study on the human capital effects of remittances was carried out by 
Cox & Ureta (2003) on the premise that human capital is crucial to long run 
growth. The authors discovered that the capacity of remittances in reducing 
dropout rates is larger than the capacity of domestic labour income, most 
especially in the urban area. A 10 per cent increase in remittance inflow 
reduces the likelihood of leaving school by 5.4 per cent (1.4 per cent in rural 
areas) in the first through sixth grades. In grades seven through twelve, the 
likelihood is reduced by 2.7 per cent (2.6% in rural areas).  Similarly, Yang 
(2003) reports that children aged 16 to 20 will increase in school enrolment 
by 10.3per cent if remittances out of total income can increase by 10 per 
cent. Lopez-Cordova (2005) contends that literacy rates among young 
adolescents in Mexico will increase as remittances increase.  Further, 
McLeod & Molina (2005) claimed that remittances increase the return to 
education at home and increase investment in human capital by the family 
left behind. 
World Bank (2006) found positive effect of remittances on economic 
growth in 67 countries between 1991 and 2005. But when investment 
variable was removed, the effect was no longer significant. When 
remittances were interacted with governance, financial depth and educational 
status, there was negative and significant effect of remittances on GDP 
growth but positive effect on both of the interacted terms. This implies that 
the impact of remittances on economic growth is conditioned on the varieties 
of domestic factors. This result is supported by Olubiyi (2013) where 
remittances interacted with governance variable before it impact positively 
and significantly on investment in Nigeria. 
Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz (2009) used internal instrument, that is, the 
lagged independent variable, and system GMM to mitigate the possible 
endogeneity problems in a sample of 73 countries between 1975 and 2002.  
They also make use of lagged dependent variable (lagged GDP per capita) as 
a conditioning variable. The result shows no significant effect of remittances 
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on economic growth. Notably, when remittances were interacted with 
financial development, GDP growth was negatively and significantly 
affected by remittances. The explanation for this is that in a country with low 
financial development, remittances substitutes for bank financing in the 
growth process. Ramirez & Shamma (2009) found the same result for Latin 
American countries between 1990 and 2005; they however used the fully 
modified OLS rather than instrumental variable (IV). Catrinescu, Leon-
Ladesma, Piracha, & Quillin (2006) used internal IV (lagged remittances) in 
a model of static and dynamic panel regression of 114 countries in 1991-
2003 periods. They also controlled for initial income, gross capital 
formation, foreign direct investment and some governance variable. The 
positive effect found in the result was not robust. 
Barajas et al (2009) argued that the distance used as the IV is time 
invariant and so was most times interacted with some other macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP growth rate, unemployment rate or the growth rate of 
GDP per capita. The problem with this IV, according to the authors, is that if 
there is any change in the macroeconomic variable, the IV will also change 
proportionately, thereby making the IV and the macroeconomic variable to 
be almost perfectly correlated.  Thus, the authors employed alternative IV 
such as transaction cost and this is associated with remittances. Arguably, 
such IV is not expected to correlate with the error term in the growth-
remittance model. Since transaction cost is not directly observed, they 
constructed the ratio of remittance to GDP of all other recipient countries.  
Using this IV in their growth equation of 84 countries between 1970 and 
2004 they found that there was no robust evidence that remittances have 
positive and significant effect on economic growth. 
Goschin (2014) was interested in the direct influence of remittances on 
development. To do this, he treated remittances as capital flows that have 
macroeconomic growth potential. He constructed two different growth 
models (one with absolute GDP and the other with relative GDP) and tested 
the models with data from the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) spanning 
1995 to 2011. Using panel estimation methods that controls for potential 
cross-section heterogeneity, he found that remittances positively influence 
both absolute and relative GDP in these countries.  However the use of 
relative GDP is not the best measure of development. 
What the theoretical and empirical reviews show is that there is no 
automatic positive effect of remittances on development. In fact the direction 
effect is conditioned on the transmission mechanism. Even at that, the effect 
may be significant or insignificant, positive or negative. Thus it is important 
to study the case of Nigeria in order to understand variables that are 
remittance-friendly in the development process. 
 
3. Methodology 
The model to investigate the role of remittances on economic growth is 
based on the extended version of the neoclassical model (Barro, 1996). This 
model is employed because some of the variables discussed in the growth 
accounting framework are present. Within this framework, the growth 
equation can be expressed as follows: 
 
ttttttt XremIHYg    5432110   
(1) 
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Where g represents economic growth at time t, Yt-1 is the initial GDP, H 
is the human capital, I stands for the investment and rem stands for 
remittances. Letter X represents a set of choice and environmental variables 
that effect economic growth while ε representsthe error term. A set of choice 
variables X include degree of openness, inflation rate, interest rate, exchange 
rate and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) governance variables. 
Two other specifications are added in order to closelyexamine the effect 
of remittances on economic development.  First, the GDP growth variable in 
equation 1 is replaced with growth rate of GDP per capita (gct) and later with 
poverty (pt) (Ravallion, 1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2004 and Capistrano and 
Sta, 2007). The specifications for these two are represented by equations 2 
and 3. 
 
tttttttt XremIHggcgc    65432110  (2) 
tttttttt XremIHggcp   6543210  
(3) 
 
3.1 Estimation and Measurement Issues 
Close investigation of equations1-3suggests the existence of possible 
endogeneity problem.  That is, the three variables – growth rate, per capita 
and poverty appear to be affected by each other.  Furthermore, investment 
and some other controlled variables may probably correlate with each other. 
Also, the equations show that GDP growth, per capita income and poverty 
are all affected by a set of third variables such as investment, governance 
system, exchange rate and perhaps improvement in the economies of the 
trading partners. Most of these third variables exhibit some relationships 
among themselves, thereby strengthening the endogeneity problem. 
There are several ways of dealing with endogeneity issues and this 
include but not limited to the use of IV, conditioning variables or appropriate 
estimation technique.  Since there is no conclusive result arising from the use 
of IV and conditioning variable, this study employed a Generalized System 
of Moments (GMM), which is considered to be an appropriate technique of 
estimation. GMM has been considered to be a powerful and most widely 
used estimation technique to deal with endogeneity problems. 
Meanwhilesince remittances and some macroeconomic variables are 
believed to be persistent, the Arellano-Bover System GMM was used.  
Based on Barajas et al (2009) we further interact remittances with other 
variables such as governance, investment, and human capital variables in 
order to capture complementarity or otherwise of remittances on other 
variables  in development process.  The estimable equations in the Arellano-
Bover GMM version aregiven in equations 4 to 6. 
 
tttitttttt XVremremIHgg    76543110 *  
(4) 
 
tttitttttt XVremremIHpcpc    76543110 *  
(5)
 
 
tttitttttt XVremremIHpp    76543110 * (6) 
 
Where V is a set of interacting variables mentioned above and other 
variables are as defined in equations 1 to 3. 
One possible setback in the use of GMM to estimate a model where some 
of the variables reported zeroes or unreported or omitted observation is that 
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in the process of differencing, the concerned variables will be dropped due to 
non-orthogonality.  Since poverty data was not reported yearly, it is possible 
to encounter this problem.  This problem is addressed by computing the 
average rate of change between two periods.   
3.2 Sources of data 
Several of the variables employed in the analysis are common 
macroeconomic variables available from annual publications. GDP growth, 
interest rate, exchange rate and inflation rate were sourced from the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin (2013 online version). Fixed 
capital formation proxy for investment and was sourced from the CBN 
Statistical Bulletin (online version) while GDP per capita and poverty data 
were from the annual yearbook of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 
213). Workers’ Remittances was extracted from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Yearbook (2013). Tertiary school 
enrolment proxy for human capital development and it was sourced from 
World Development Indicators, 2013. Governance variables were taken 
from the widely used ICRG published by the Political Risk Service (PRS).  
Degree of openness was computed as the sum of export and import divided 
by GDP.  The exports and imports data were also taken from the CBN 
Statistical Bulletin (2013 online version). Since all the variables were 
extracted from different sources, the series were transformed to logarithmic 
value to ascertain the same measurement.  The logarithmic transformation 
also have an added advantage of controlling for omitted variables.  However, 
GDP growth inflation and interest rates were excluded from such 
transformation. 
 
4. Presentation of result 
4.1. Results of Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix in Table 1 shows pairwise relationship of 
variables.  Remittances and GDP growth showed negative but insignificant 
relationship, suggesting that remittances could be countercyclical. But 
remittances had positive and significant relationship with poverty (lnpov) 
and per capita income (lngpci). This implies that remittances could influence 
and could be influenced by per capita GDP. Contrary to expectation, poverty 
did not improve with remittances (0.71) or GDP (0.61). This latter negative 
correlation may be explained by the poverty gap between income levels in 
Nigeria. Amidst income inequality in Nigeria, it is quite possible that growth 
rates improve in the face of increasing poverty. The core poor are also the 
ones least able to afford to send a member of their household abroad, 
therefore least likely to benefit from remittances. Middle-income households 
have higher migration rates than poorer households since the latter lack the 
means for mobility.  
The relationship between governance variables and remittances reveal 
positive and significant outcome, that is, improved governance is associated 
with increased remittances and vice-vasa. It is of note that exchange rate had 
a negative association with remittances. Hence, during exchange rate 
depreciation, inflow of remittances subsides. It also means that increased 
remittances generate appreciation.   
Several explanatory variables are positively correlated with GDP and 
statistically strong. Human capital (0.7993), exchange rate (0.6390) and 
investment (0.5756) are positively and significantly correlated with GDP. 
Specifically, additional schooling or human capital, captured using 
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enrolment rates has a positive relationship with economic size (GDP). The 
relationship between exchange rate and investment was positive and 
significant. Further, exchange rates were positively correlated with openness 
(0.77), law and order (0.40) and poverty (0.89).In addition the positive 
correlation with political stability (0.3493) implies that in more stable 
conditions workers remit more. Also the positive relationship between 
remittances and corruption (0.13) suggests that improvement in corruption 
will aid more remittance inflows. 
 
/See Appendix 1/ 
 
4.2 Results of Model Estimation (Ordinary Least Square) 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) results begin by investigating the 
determinants of GDP growth, starting from the traditional variables such as 
human capital, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate, after which 
governance variables and remittances were introduced (Table 2). 
 
/See Appendix 2/ 
 
The values of the adjusted R-squared and the F-statistics show that the 
variables are well fitted and are important in the growth process.  Physical 
capital (Lninv), human capital (Lnhc), inflation (infl), exchange rate (Lnexr) 
and per capita income (Lnpci) significantly determine the growth of GDP.  
All the variables were rightly signed except human capital that negatively 
affected GDP growth.  The negative effect could be an evidence of the 
difference between town and gown, that is, there may be a disconnect 
between skill acquired in school and the one needed in the labour market.  
None of the governance variables significantly impacted on GDP growth 
even though control of corruption (Cor) and political stability (Pol) showed 
expected signs.  However, the interaction of remittances with investment 
(model 5), human capital (model 6) and each of the governance variables 
(models 7 to 9) indicated that remittances (Reminv) tend to substitute 
investment, but complements control of corruption (Remcor) and strong 
political stability (Rempol) to improve the GDP growth. What this implies is 
that for remittances to effectively influence GDP, corruption must be 
curtailed while political stability must be encouraged. 
 
/See Appendix 3/ 
 
The second measure of development, that is, per capita income showed in 
Table 3 contrasted from the model of GDP growth.  First, most variables that 
were significant in the GDP models were rendered insignificant, even as the 
equations were well specified given the adjusted R-squared values. Second, 
the impact of investment and exchange rate on per capita income decrease 
both in magnitude and significance. Third and most especially, remittances 
have positive but mild and insignificant effect on per capita income in all the 
scenarios considered. The lower contribution of workers’ remittances to per 
capita income could be traced to weak governance institutions or the absence 
of ‘trickle down’ effect. 
Exchange rates show negative impact all through the scenarios while 
investment was positive but insignificant in most of the scenarios. Unlike in 
the correlation matrix however, human capital had a marginal negative 
impact on GDP per capita (models 10-14). This latter result came about 
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because enrolment rates were used to capture human capital while they 
better capture responsiveness of economic agents, they may not express the 
skills effect on output 
The OLS results for the effects of remittances on poverty (Table 4) show 
that previous poverty levels significantly explains present poverty situation 
in each of the scenarios. Also, increase in GDP tends to significantly 
increase poverty in Nigeria, suggesting that most of the growth success 
worsens the welfare of the poor. Poverty responded negatively to 
investment, showing an inelastic response. However, when interactive 
variables were introduced, investment was no longer significant but still 
maintains its negative sign.   
Poverty is positively and significantly associated with control of 
corruption. Meanwhile, remittances have a negative but mild effect on 
poverty, again showing that the poor have reduced options to break away 
from poverty through remittances. When remittances were interacted with 
investment and the governance variables, it was discovered that investment 
complements remittances to impact negatively on poverty. What this implies 
is that remittance inflow invested tends to reduce poverty. Other interactions 
show substitutability but not significant. Thus, the result shows that 
investment matter most for remittances to reduce poverty. 
 
/See Appendix 4/ 
 
4.3: Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)Result 
The results of theGeneralised Method of Moments (GMM) showed 
improvements in the behaviour of the independent variables.  All the models 
well fitted the data and the instruments used were valid. Thus, some 
endogeneity problems and the issue of omitted variables were essentially 
addressed.  This was evidenced as considerable improvements were made in 
the subsequent model estimations.  The dynamic GMM estimation result of 
GDP model (Table 5)shows thatremittances were consistently positive and 
had significant effects on GDP. The highest magnitude of effect was noted in 
model 4 when remittances were interacted with investment, and some 
governance variables.  The result shows that remittances complement control 
of corruption and human capital development to impact positively on GDP. 
This suggests that remittances improve development through increase in 
TFP. 
 
/See Appendix 5/ 
 
Observably, human capital on its own exerts negative and significant 
effect on GDP. Thus, this result suggests that the negative effect of human 
capital on GDP could be reduced by remittances. The dynamic effect of 
remittances on GDP was notable when it was interacted with all the 
governance variables, human capital and investment. First, changes in 
remittances result in positive change in GDP. Second, remittances act as 
substitute to investment in the growth process. This suggests that although 
marginal efficiency of capital is high, remittances substitute for low 
investment to spur growth. Third, remittances complement control of 
corruption to exert positive and significant effect on GDP. This means that 
the capacity of remittances to improve growth is high when governance 
institution is favourable. Besides, the magnitude of coefficient of elasticity 
was notable (0.51) compared to the magnitude of the complementarity of 
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remittances and law and order (remold) on GDP, which was computed to be 
0.01.   
Other variables such as inflation, interest rate, exchange rate, and lagged 
GDP were rightly signed.  Inflation rate had an adverse, albeit sizable effect 
on GDP growth. Exchange rate has a positive and significant association 
with GDP, suggesting that depreciation appeared to improve the economic 
performance of Nigeria.  Interest rate has a positive and significant effect on 
GDP while degree of openness showed negative effect. These results were in 
contrast to what is expected.  Perhaps the reason for negative effect of 
openness on GDP was as a result of high import demand.  
The results of the dynamic model for per capita income provided a 
slightly different but somehow consistent result. The level of significance 
reduced when all the interactive variables were introduced but the direction 
of effect was consistent for most variables (Table 6). Meanwhile, 
remittances have insignificant effects on per capita income except in model 
12 (when all the interactive variables were introduced). The remittance 
elasticity of per capita income was high (1.58), suggesting that per capita 
income was sensitive to changes in remittances. 
 
/See Appendix 6/ 
 
The interaction of remittances with investment and with human capital 
was insignificant. The magnitude of complementarity of remittances and 
control of corruption was very small but significant. This suggests that for 
remittances to impact positively on per capita income, control of corruption 
must be effective.   
The third measure of economic development was poverty level and the 
result of how remittances dynamically affect it is presented in Table 8.  
Unlike the first two GMM results, the effect of remittances on poverty was 
positive but insignificant. When remittances were interacted with corruption, 
the insignificance still prevailed. Furthermore, the interaction of remittances 
and law and order (remold) provided mild effect on poverty (0.006).   
Unlike results from previous papers, our result shows that increase 
remittances worsened the condition of the poor. Not only that, the interaction 
of remittances with investment increases poverty in Nigeria. The only 
channel through which poverty can be reduced by remittances is human 
capital development. This suggests that the poor benefits from the TFP 
generated by remittances but not from altruism or investment. 
 
/See Appendix 7/ 
 
Investment, and law and order showed negative and significant effect on 
poverty. That is, increase in domestic investment and improvement in law 
and order tend to significantly reduce poverty with respective estimate of 
0.56 and 0.14. The positive effect of GDP on poverty is an evidence of 
growth without development, that is, the economic growth pattern of Nigeria 
appears to worsen the welfare condition of the poor. The level of poverty in 
Nigeria was so dynamic that previous poverty impact positively on 
contemporaneous poverty, suggesting that lack of improvement in poverty 
will have a far-reaching negative impact on future poverty.  
Inflation, exchange rate and degree of openness showed no significant 
effect on poverty.  Notably, the magnitude of effect of each of these 
variables (except openness) was negligible, implying that the poverty 
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situation in Nigeria is so pervasive that inflation has no impact.  The 
interpretation of this is that most poor people are still grappling with the 
essential needs and so any changes in price level will not stop the 
consumption pattern, although it will worsen their condition. 
 
5. Conclusion and Remarks 
Several studies have claimed that remittances facilitate development by 
improving overall welfare condition of the receiving countries. Also in 
Nigeria, some analysts have established a poverty reducing effects of 
remittances. But if the result is anything to go by, why is poverty rate 
increasing in the face of continuous huge flow of remittances? We argue that 
the developmental effect of remittances does not translate to improved 
overall well-being. On the one hand, remittances improve economic growth 
and per capita income. On the other hand, it worsens overall welfare, that is, 
poverty. With the aid of a mix of theories of remittances and the use of 
Generalized Method of Moments for the period 1980-2013, three reasons 
can be established to explain why remittances could aggravate poverty. First, 
remittances beneficiaries are concentrated in the middle income class with 
high propensity to consume, low investment and weak ‘trickle down’ effect.  
Second, due to high propensity to consume, consumption triggers good 
prices in such a way as to worsen the purchasing power of the poor, thereby 
aggravating the poor position. Third, institutions are weak and the poor do 
not benefit from weak institution. As long as remittances strive where good 
quality institution exist, they will only be better off when institutions 
improve.   
However, quality of human capital development enables remittances to 
reduce poverty. Following these results, the authorities should note that 
remittances on its own cannot reduce poverty in Nigeria. The authorities 
should therefore provide enabling environment, such as enhancing quality 
governance, improve investment climate and discourage ostentatious 
spending of remittances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1. 
 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix of the variables 
  g Lninv lnhc lnrem Infl intrt lnexr Pol cor lod lnopen lnpov lngpci 
g 1 
            
lninv 0.5756* 1 
           
lnhc 0.7993* 0.6027* 1 
          
lnrem -0.315 -0.332 0.4487* 1 
         
infl -0.017 -0.216 -0.287 -0.3 1 
        
intrt 0.4211* 0.7181* 0.4507* -0.6049* 0.0742 1 
       
lnexr 0.6390* 0.9372* 0.6594* -0.5502* -0.0912 0.7573* 1 
      
pol -0.055 0.0394 -0.006 0.3493* -0.0513 -0.276 -0.01 1 
     
cor -0.3888* -0.7829* -0.6150* 0.13 0.4679* -0.4102* -0.7292* -0.3 1 
    
lod 0.207 0.2819 0.3134 0.7174* 0.3317 0.6034* 0.4085* -0.3787* 0.035 1 
   
lnopen 0.3574* 0.6694* 0.3508* -0.7046* 0.2081 0.7691* 0.7767* -0.33 -0.312 0.6863* 1 
  
lnpov 0.6135* 0.7769* 0.6116* 0.7186* -0.0078 0.7823* 0.8974* -0.25 -0.4594* 0.5828* 0.7842* 1 
 
lngpci 0.159 0.6394* 0.1342 0.4122* -0.4564* 0.221 0.3824* 0.3692* -0.6473* -0.3536* 0.047 0.0939 1 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 2. 
 
Table 2:Result of the OLS estimates (growth rate of GDP) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
g 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.014 0.013 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Lninv .125*** .125*** .108** .132*** .46** .542** 0.45* .584** .557** 
Lnhc -.161*** -.161*** -.129** -.123** -.207*** -0.496 -0.82 -0.89 -0.8 
Lnrem 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.014 0.229* 0.065 -0.34 -0.3 -0.2* 
infl -.00169** 0.001* 0.00 0.00 .00199** -.00219** 0.001* 0.001* .001* 
intrt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Lnexr .0596** .0597** .0772** 0.07* .0883* .096** 0.07 0.13* .187** 
Lngpci .112** 0.11* 0.14* 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10 
Pol 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 -0.56 -0.57 -0.61* 
Cor 
  
0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.46 -0.59 
Lod 
   
-0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04* -0.04* 0.35 
Reminv 
   
-0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.03 -0.03* 
Remhc 
    
0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Remcor 
     
0.04 0.04 0.04*** 
Rempol 
      
0.03 0.03* 
Remlod 
       
-0.02* 
_cons 12.1*** 12.1*** 11.6*** 11.6*** 8.91*** 11.8* 18.3* 18.5* 16.5* 
r2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.989 0.99 0.991 0.99 0.99 0.99 
r2_a 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.982 0.984 0.984 0.98 0.99 0.99 
F 224 190 169 159 164 147 138 138 148 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 3. 
 
Table 3:  Result of OLS estimates (log of GDP per capita) 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
L.lngpci .653*** .463* 0.216 0.191 .165 .119 .098 -.078 -.101 
Lninv 0.090 0.218 .313** .386** .861 .459 .357 -.299 -.446 
Lnhc -0.004 -0.119 -0.279 -0.265 -.401 .849 .125 .736 .799 
Lnrem 0.040 0.038 0.032 0.033 .332 1.01 .197 .238 .112 
Infl -.00135       -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -.005 -004 -.003 -.002 -.001 
Intrt -0.003 0.011 0.021 0.032 .032 .029 .032 .036* .036* 
Lnexr -0.027 -0.131 -0.294** -0.284* .030 -.284* -.330* -.615** -.752** 
Lg 0.315 0.306 0.578 0.248 -.237 .167 .061 .609 .954 
Pol 
 
0.105* .122** .123** .031 .117* .113 1.717 2.076 
Cor 
  
-0.322* -0.236 .114* -.202 -1.458 -1.194 -.875 
Lod 
   
-0.093 -.103 -.094 -.101 -.074 -.774 
Reminv 
    
-.024 -001 .009 .052 .059 
Remhc 
     
-.071 -.029 -.049 -.048 
Remcor 
      
.075 .056 .029 
Rempol 
       
-.094 -.113 
Remold 
        
.045 
_cons -3.490 -2.180 -2.200 1.060 0.053 -11.500 .960 1.840 3.820 
r2 0.951 0.958 0.963 0.966 0.968 0.969 0.970 0.973 0.973 
r2_a 0.934 0.940 0.945 0.948 0.950 0.949 0.948 0.950 0.948 
F 56.000 55.400 54.200 52.400 54.200 49.300 44.600 43.400 39.000 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 4. 
 
Table 4:  Result of OLS estimates (Poverty) 
Variable 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
L.lnpov .72*** .621** .467** .436** .43** 0.374* 0.364* 0.376* 0.375* 
Lninv -0.106* -.128** -.137** -.169*** -0.369 -0.540 -0.511 -0.555 -0.539 
Lnhc 0.064 0.095 .175** .166** .222** 0.704 0.951 0.975 0.971* 
Lnrem -0.032* -0.031* -0.024* -0.026* -0.154 -0.092 -0.359 -0.350 -0.366 
Infl 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Intrt -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
Lnexr -0.010 0.007 0.055 0.048 0.023 0.020 0.032 0.017 0.032 
Lg .608** .689** .713*** .89*** .996*** 1.05*** 1.09*** 1.11*** 1.08** 
Pol 
 
-0.026 -0.019 -0.020 -0.015 -0.018 -0.016 0.097 0.058 
Cor 
  
.178** 0.133* 0.107 0.114 0.509 0.541 0.500 
Lod 
   
-0.044* -0.049* -0.054* -0.056** -0.058* -0.142* 
Reminv 
   
0.010* 0.020* 0.017* 0.020* 0.019* 
Remhc 
    
-0.027 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 
Remcor 
     
-0.024 -0.026 -0.022 
Rempol 
      
-0.007 -0.005 
Remold 
       
-0.005 
_cons -5.710 -6.510* -7.7** -9.28** -8.8** -13.700* -18.500 -18.900 -18.600 
r2 0.939 0.942 0.958 0.963 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.967 
r2_a 0.918 0.918 0.937 0.943 0.942 0.941 0.939 0.935 0.931 
F 44.200 39.800 47.400 47.600 43.100 39.100 34.900 30.800 27.200 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 5.  
 
Table 5: System GMM Estimates (log of GDP)  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lnrem .0202*** .128* 0.122 .889** .707** 0.003* 
Lninv .188*** .349*** .385** .262** .304*** 0.285*** 
Lnhc -.174*** -.221*** -0.558 -1.22*** -1.05*** 0.002** 
Infl -.00163*** -.00186*** -.00203*** -.00165*** -.00159*** 0.003 
Intrt .015*** .0125*** .015*** .0117*** .0121*** 0.049** 
Lnexr .0544*** .07*** .0712*** .0428* .0627** 0.017* 
Pol 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0052 -0.0089 -0.128 0.189 
Cor -0.0392 -0.0486 -0.0572 -1.16** -.947*** -.803** 
Lod -.0244*** -.0297*** -.0312*** -.0145** -.0202*** -.0246*** 
Lnopen -.124*** -.115*** -.126*** -.219*** -.215*** -.188*** 
Reminv -0.0092 -0.011 -0.0024 -0.006 -.00737* 
L.lngdp .548** .324*** .894*** .00163*** .0768*** .188* 
Remhc 
 
0.0207 .0612** .0507*** .0409** 
Remcor 
  
.0733** .0605*** .0521*** 
Rempol 
   
0.0069 0.0105 
Remold 
    
0.010** 
_cons 12.9*** 11.5*** 15.6*** 28.4*** 25.5*** 22.9*** 
r2 0.989 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.993 
r2_a 0.984 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.986 0.987 
Hansen overid (chi-sqr) 14.151 15.294 17.841 13.931 17.764 21.037 
Hansen overid (p-value) 0.166 0.1694 0.1206 0.3051 0.2178 0.1357 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 6. 
 
Table 6: System GMM estimates (Log of GDP per capita) 
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Lnrem 0.001 0.35 0.602 -0.352 0.366 1.58** 
Lninv .248** 0.81 .679** 0.34 0.338 -0.356 
Lnhc 0.017 -0.22 0.182 -0.365 0.329 2.5 
Infl .00291** -.00435** -.00432*** -.00274** -.00301** -0.096* 
Intrt 0.01 0.01 0.0155 .0167* .0221*** 0.051* 
Lnexr -.555*** -.503*** -.497*** -.544***      -.705*** -0.956* 
Pol .19*** .178*** .169*** .124***       1.41** 0.09* 
Cor -.389*** -.385*** -.385*** -2.71***      -1.06 -0.311 
Lod -.139*** -.137*** -.124*** -.114***      -.137*** -0.544* 
Lnopen .632*** .661*** .61*** .476***        .55*** 0.593* 
g 1.77*** 1.4** 1.1*** .954***       1.34*** 2.12** 
L.lngpci -0.02 -0.06 -0.0308 -0.0384 -.218*** -0.391* 
Reminv -0.03 -0.0162 0.00838 0.0114 0.0519 
Remhc 
 
-0.0282 0.00584 -0.0254 -0.144 
Remcor 
  
.138**  .0423* 0.0119* 
Rempol 
   
-.0725*** -0.111* 
Remold 
    
0.0294 
_cons -20.4*** -19.5*** -19.6* -2.13 -21* -52*** 
r2 0.967 0.97 0.975 0.974 0.978 0.98 
r2_a 0.947 0.95 0.955 0.949 0.955 0.956 
Hansen overid (chi-sqr) 11.67 11.2 19.032 12.0857 13.8672 13.9471 
Hansen overid (p-value) 0.308 0.43 0.1878 0.4388 0.4597 0.4537 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Appendix 7. 
 
Table 7:  System GMM Estimates (Poverty) 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Lnrem -0.0137 -0.144 0.0051 0.0543 0.171 0.308 
Lninv -0.0782 -0.289 -.356* -.35** -.585** -.555** 
Lnhc 0.0697 0.14 0.396 0.425 .775* .897** 
Infl 0.0001 0.00052 .00062* .00061* .00111* 0.00102 
Intrt -0.00505 -0.00493 -.00682* -.00585* -.00691** -.00789** 
Lnexr 0.0381 0.0231 0.0127 0.019 -0.0206 0.00779 
Pol -0.00597 -0.00372 -0.00419 -0.00492 .282* 0.187 
Cor .136*** .115** .118** 0.227 0.405 0.419 
Lod -.0298* -.0393** -.0386** -.0394** -.0504*** -.138** 
Lnopen -.104* -0.119 -0.0795 -0.0852 -.108* -0.094 
Lngdp 0.47 .615** .637** .593** .759*** .735*** 
L.lnpov .737*** .669*** .662*** .653***       .603*** .563*** 
Reminv 
 
0.0104 0.0142 .0138* .0264* .0243* 
Remhc 
  
-0.0145 -0.017 -0.033 -.0415* 
Remcor 
   
-0.00816 -0.019 0.019 
Rempol 
    
-.0172** 0.0118 
Remlod 
     
.0055* 
_cons -4.65 -4.45 -7.45* -7.47 -12* -13.6** 
r2 0.957 0.96 0.961 0.96 0.964 0.964 
r2_a 0.929 0.931 0.929 0.923 0.925 0.919 
Hansen overid (chi-sqr) 10.4557 12.3202 14.8192 14.6794 14.4468 12.8192 
Hansen overid (p-value) 0.3401 0.3188 0.4004 0.404 0.417 0.3188 
Note: *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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